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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARVIN JEAN JACQUES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950384-CA

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FQR REHEARING
1.

Did this Court, in applying the second prong of Rule

901(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, properly determine that the
non-expert witness' testimony was inadmissible because there was
a possibility that her familiarity with defendant's handwriting
may have been gained by looking at documents from past
prosecutions and comparing them to documents in the present
prosecution?
2.

Did this Court properly determine that the error in

admitting the non-expert witness' testimony was not sufficiently
inconsequential as to constitute harmless error?

ARGUMENT
PQINT ONE
BECAUSE THE STATE ADEQUATELY
DEMONSTRATED THAT THE NON-EXPERT'S
FAMILIARITY WITH DEFENDANT'S
HANDWRITING PREDATED THE PRESENT
LITIGATION, THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT HER
TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE
This Court determined that Sherry Ragan, a non-expert
witness, should not have been permitted to testify about the
authenticity of defendant's handwriting under rule 901(b)(2)
because the State failed to "demonstrate that Ms. Ragan's ability
to identify defendant's handwriting predated the present
litigation, i.e., that she did not gain such familiarity
specifically for purposes of preparing to testify in the present
action."

Jacques, slip. op. at 6 (citations omitted).1

1

To support this conclusion, the Court cites two cases,
neither of which are analogous to this case. In the first case,
the prosecution produced a witness whom it tried unsuccessfully
to qualify as a handwriting expert. The witness subsequently
testified as a non-expert under rule 901(b)(2). The appellate
court properly determined that this was error because the
witness' familiarity with defendant's handwriting was
unquestionably acquired M l ) after the grand jury returned the
indictment against the appellant [by government subpoena of
handwriting exemplars], and (2) for the sole purpose of
testifying at Cepeda's trial." People v. Cepeda. 851 F.2d 1564,
1567 (9th Cir. 1988).
In the second case, a trial court refused to allow an
attorney representing defendant in another action in another
3

Ragan testified at length outside the presence of the jury
about how and when she had become familiar with defendant's
handwriting:
The State;

In what capacity do you know him
[defendant]?

Witness:

Prosecuting him two or three times.

The State:

For what cases?

Witness:

I had a case against him six or seven
years ago for a burglary that was
dismissed, and then prosecuted him for
prescription fraud.

The State:

In connection with those prosecutions,
have you seen what you consider to be
the defendant's handwriting?

Witness:

Yes.

The State:

And how many documents have you seen?

Witness:

I think probably four or five, and
letters that he's written to me and
motions that he's filed, court documents
that he's filed for himself in cases.

The State:

And in connection with these documents

state to opine about the authenticity of a signature of a witness
in the case before the court. The appellate court upheld this
ruling because the witness had "acquired any expertise he
arguably had for purposes of a pending criminal investigation;"
and because his "familiarity" consisted only of a "one-shot
comparison" of two documents, lacking in the extent of
familiarity contemplated by rule 901(b)(2). United States v.
Pitts. 569 P.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied. 436 U.S.
959 (1978).
4

and the letters written to you, have you
had conversations with Marvin regarding
the contents of those letters?
Witness:

(R. 80-81).

Not the letters, but as to the motions
following his filing those in court.
Then he would appeal in court and argue
those motions in his own behalf
indicating he had written them.

Ragan thus clearly testified that her familiarity

was developed over the course of several years in which she twice
prosecuted defendant.

Based on this past familiarity,

established by the State through this foundational testimony,
Ragan identified State's exhibit #10 as a letter she had received
from defendant in the course of one of the previous prosecutions
(R. 81). She then opined that two other exhibits, a letter and
an envelope, appeared to be in defendant's handwriting (R. 8182).

The trial court ruled that the documents were admissible as

a matter of law, and that Ragan was a competent non-expert
witness (R. 90-91).

The court also stated that the evidence was

necessitated by the allegation that defendant had tried to
disguise his handwriting in the court-ordered sample (R. 99).
Defendant objected that Ragan was not a handwriting expert,
that Ragan didn't see who wrote the documents, that there was no
foundation for the writings, and that only the court-ordered
sample should be admissible (R. 86, 90, 91). Notably, he did not
5

object on the ground that Ragan's familiarity with his
handwriting was gained solely for the purposes of this
litigation.
In ruling that Ragan's testimony should not have been
admitted, this Court now raises a new factual possibility:
[Ragan's] testimony is insufficient . . . because
it fails to dispel the possibility . . . that she
simply pulled defendant's files from past
prosecutions and compared his handwriting found
therein to the handwriting on the letter and
envelope submitted in the present prosecution, all
for the sole purpose of testifying in this
litigation at the request of her fellow
prosecutor.
Jacques. slip. op. at 6.

This is an argument not presented

below, raised by the Court sua sponte on appeal. As such, given
Ragan's explicit foundational testimony, it should not provide a
ground for reversal.2 ££. State v. Stegaell. 660 P.2d 252, 259
(Utah 1983)(court will not consider issue raised for the first
time on appeal).

2

Rule 901(b)(2) is silent on the Court's implication that
refreshing one's recollection by examining a document with which
the witness is already familiar somehow creates a fatal flaw,
invalidating the past familiarity and replacing it with
familiarity gained only for purposes of this litigation.
6

POINT TWQ
ABSENT THE TESTIMONY OF THE NONEXPERT WITNESS, THE REMAINING FACTS
DEMONSTRATE NO REASONABLE
LIKELIHOOD OF THE JURY RETURNING A
VERDICT MORE FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT
This Court determined that the trial court's error in
admitting Sherry Ragan's authentication testimony was not
harmless.

Jacques, slip. op. at 8.

In reaching this conclusion,

the Court has misconstrued the record facts. When read
correctly, the record obviates the possibility of a more
favorable result for defendant, even in the absence of Sherry
Ragan' s test imony.
First, referring to the court-ordered writing sample in
which defendant tried to disguise his handwriting (State's
exhibit #3), the Court states:
After proper authentication, the State's
expert testified that the specimen shared 1820 points of common identification with the
prescription -- not enough on which to base
an opinion that the prescription was
definitely written by defendant.
Jacques, slip. op. at 7.

This statement, however, does not

accurately reflect the record evidence.

During the questioning

in which Chuck Senn was being qualified as a questioned document
examiner, the following exchange occurred:

7

The State:

Is there a particular scale that
you use in determining how sure you
are about a document?

Witness:

[B]ecause it is an evaluative
process, I try to stay between 10
to 20 points of identification to
be able to be highly probable or
positive that the person did it.

(R. 115-116) .
Senn then testified at length about the court-ordered
writing sample.

Initially, he stated:

From going through the writing, it was -from doing handwriting for a long time I
could tell there were definitely some
capricious changes made. In other words,
someone was fooling around with their slant
and the way that they made things.
(R. 133). Still referring to the court-ordered sample, he
continued, "However, we still leave things behind.

We still

leave points. And in going through it, I came up with -- I think
it was around 18 to 20 points that I knew I had from this" (Id.).
The prosecutor then directly questioned Senn about the
authorship of the court-ordered sample:
The State:

So you indicated you found 18 to 20
points of similarity between this
document, State's exhibit 3, and the
prescription; is that correct?

Witness:

That's correct.

The State:

So from that document what is your -8

where does that fall in your certainty
level?
Witness:

It would be my opinion that all of these
documents were written by the same
individual.

(R. 134). Consistent with Senn's expert opinion and contrary to
this Court's conclusion, the 18-20 points of identification in
the court-ordered sample provided a sufficient basis for his
opinion that the prescription was definitely written by
defendant.
Second, in its opinion, the Court also states:
Had Ms. Ragan been precluded from authenticating
the writings at issue, the expert would have been
left with only the problematic court-ordered
sample to compare with the prescription. Although
the court-ordered sample contained 18-20 points of
common identification with the prescription, it
was not nearly as incriminating as the comparison
with the samples authenticated by Ms. Ragan, which
contained all 32 possible points of common
identification. Thus, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have returned a
verdict in favor of defendant in the absence of
Ms. Ragan's testimony and the resulting evidence.
Jacques, slip op. at 8 (footnote omitted).

While the Court is

correct in recognizing that 32 points of identification may be
more incriminating than 18-20 points, that statement does not
undercut the expert's testimony that the lesser number of points

9

was sufficient for a positive identification.3

Indeed, Senn

testified, "Again, depending upon how strong of points we find,
10 to 20 is normally what I would use for positive
identification.
[sic].

Doing 32, obviously someone might say, overkill

But there's alot of writing here that can be used for

identification" (R. 131).
Senn's testimony was consistent.

He never veered from his

opinion that the court-ordered sample was written by defendant.
While he chose to focus for comparison purposes on the documents
Ragan authenticated, rather than on the court-ordered sample, he
did so for reasons of practicality and efficiency:
With all of the capricious changes in here
[the court-ordered sample] it would be very
difficult for me to sit up there and for the
lay person to look at it and say, yeah, these
were made by the same person. I can tell you
that as an expert, but to try and prove it to
you, it was definitely a lot better to use
the natural handwriting.
(R. 134). That the court-ordered sample was problematic did not,
however, undermine Senn's opinion that it was written by the same
person who wrote the prescription.

The following exchange on

redirect examination clarifies Senn's unwavering position:

3

By analogy, one might be more pregnant at eight months
than at one month, but that does not render a pregnancy at one
month any less real.
10

The S t a t e :

Is there any q u e s t i o n in y o u r m i n d that
S t a t e ' s exhibit #3 [the c o u r t - o r d e r e d
s a m p l e ] , w h i c h the d e f e n d a n t w r o t e , is
the same h a n d w r i t i n g as w r i t t e n on the
Percocet p r e s c r i p t i o n ?

Wit, nP-5P •

N^

The State:

RIT"

Now, w h e n y o u say you couldn't p r o v e it
••:' to a jury, aren't y o u in fact saying it
w o u l d be difficult to put it: on the
board?

Witness:

Sure.

The S t a t e :

W h e n y o u look at these h a n d w r i t i n g
samples you use a m i c r o s c o p e and that to
e s t a b l i s h the same p o i n t s y o u showed on
the b o a r d here today?

Witness:

Yes.
:

A n d is it e x p e n s i v e t :::: :::3 : € at:e • ::: ei I leads
from a m i c r o s c o p e ?

Witness:

Y e s , T h e y have to be p h o t o g r a p h e d
and t h e n go from t h e r e .

The S t a t e :

So w h e n y o u say y o u couldn't p r o v e it t, : •
a jury, y o u ' r e s a y i n g it's easier to
d e m o n s t r a t e on the b o a r d wi th the o t h e r
samples?

Witness:

T h a t ' s correct

11

first

The State:

But it's your opinion there was a
positive match, in the high seventy
category,4 with this handwriting sample
to the handwriting sample on the
prescription?

Witness:

That would be my opinion.

(R. 148-49).

Thus, absent the documents Ragan authenticated, the

State still had a positive identification between the courtordered writing sample and the questioned prescription.

Senn's

expert testimony definitively matching the court-ordered writing
sample with the questioned prescription provided the crucial link
in the testimony necessary to convict defendant.

Notably,

defendant did not produce a rebuttal witness to dispute Senn's
testimony.
Furthermore, even if the evidence that came in through
Sherry Ragan is discounted, the remaining evidence must still be
construed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

In

reciting the circumstantial evidence adduced by the State, the
Court has misconstrued one other relevant fact.
*that defendant possibly

The Court opines

had the opportunity to obtain blank

prescription pads" and, in a footnote, adds that the room in
which defendant was examined whad contained blank prescription

4

This term was never explained, nor does it appear
anywhere else in the record.
12

pads, perhaps
Olsen."

including some in the name of his associate, Dr.

Jacques, slip. op. at 8 & n.5 (emphasis added).

The Court's use of the qualifiers ''possibly" and "perhaps"
I

I IN ill

\ ! I1 J dill I l

I I'

I I li

\ *

i i i |

I II

l i d t t J III I d I I

I

| I I , K I i J - I N I 'in1,1 I 11

practiced with the doctor whose name appeared on the forged
prescription, testified that he saw defendant in the Ephraim
c] :i i 3 :i c DII the da} b e f o r e the forged presor i pf ion w ,i :i t fdin:if:,i M ,
that p r e s c r i p t i o n p a d s w e r e left u n s u p e r v i s e d in the clinic
defendant w as al oi m • i r i I::l le

i, .

e x a m i n a t i o n room b e f o r e t h e d o c t o r e x a m i n e d h i m
Based on this evidence, there was more than a

Viv.

,^f

,*. 7 J / .

possible

opp :i):ii : t'i :i n :i tr;,, £ : •] : d e f e n d a n t it ::: :::: b t a :i i i a 1: •] an: ill :: prescr
In addition, each doctor does not have his or her own
personal prescription pads, as the opinion infers.

A cursory-

examination of the forged prescription reveals that all oi the
clinic's doctors at all locations are named on the prescription
pad,1.

ii*j£ al li

"

"

" "

,, lM \ , > , i\ " , n i a I

examination room would necessarily

not "perhaps1"

My

have had

Dr. Olsen's name on -iixiic State's case was further strengthened by fin li I i ni
*f *"

employees in the pharmacy where defendant tendered the
"I i 1 :m :i 1 € :ine i II, II11 -1 t•"i}-1 */1 I 11ess cL»i,i,1 d p o s i t i v e l y

ldenti

defendant, they provided strong circumstantial corroboration
through physical descriptions of the individual and his
distinctive cherry red sports car (R. 44-45, 49-50).
Apart from the testimony and evidence that came in through
Sherry Ragan, the State adduced evidence on all elements of the
crime for which defendant was convicted.

Accordingly, even

omitting the Ragan testimony, and construing the remaining
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there
is simply no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
defendant.

£££ State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the State asks this Court to modify
its opinion to conform with the record evidence and to affirm
defendant's conviction.

Pursuant to rule 35(a), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, the State certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this H ^ d a y of October, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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ORME, Presiding Judge:
Defendant Marvin J. Jacques appeals his conviction for
uttering a forged prescription
He contends the trial court
erroneously admitted nonexpert opinion testimony of the
genuineness of handwriting claimed to be his. We reverse
defendant•s conviction and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
On September 2 7, 1994, an individual entered the Art city
Pharmacy in Springville, Utah, seeking to fill a prescription for
the narcotic, Percocet. The prescription was made out to James
Brooks and signed by Dr. Darrel Olsen. Being suspicious of the
spelling "Percoceth" in the prescription, the pharmacist's
assistant asked her supervisor, to look at the prescription.
Attempts were made to contact Dr. Olsen to verify the
prescription, but to no avail. The police department was
subsequently contacted,: but officers arrived after the customer
had left the pharmacy.- :'-The police learned from witnesses at the
pharmacy that the customer*was an African-American male,
approximately 6!2" tal], and drove a small red sports car.

Defendant Jacques was subsequently arrested and charged with
uttering a forged prescription in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8 (4) (a) (iii) (1996), a third degree felony. At trial, the
State tried to connect defendant to the forged prescription in
several ways. In addition to showing that defendant had been in
the office of Dr. Olsen's partner on the previous day, met the
general description of the customer who presented the
prescription, and drove a red sports car, the State adduced the
testimony of two handwriting witnesses. The first of these
witnesses, an expert in comparative handwriting, administered a
court-ordered handwriting exercise to defendant. At trial, this
expert testified that he could not state conclusively, on the
basis of the court-ordered specimen, whether the prescription was
written by defendant. The expert opined that the specimen had
been deliberately written to be at variance with defendant's
usual penmanship.
The second handwriting witness was Sherry Ragan, a Utah
County prosecutor with no expertise in the area of handwriting
analysis. Ms. Ragan offered her opinion concerning the
genuineness of defendant's handwriting in several documents
allegedly penned and addressed by defendant to the prosecutor's
office and to the trial court in the course of the present
litigation. After hearing Ms. Raganfs testimony, the trial court
found the writings to be authentic and admitted them into
evidence. These supposedly authenticated samples of defendant's
handwriting were later compared by the handwriting expert to the
handwriting on the forged prescription. On the basis of these
samples, the expert was able to testify conclusively that the
forged prescription was written by defendant.
The jury returned its verdict of guilty, and the trial court
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not
to exceed five years.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we
apply several standards of review. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d
1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993). See also State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d
774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991) (stating that several standards of review
must be employed given that the trial court's determination of
admissibility involves both legal and factual conclusions). In
determining whether the trial court properly admitted the opinion
of a nonexpert for authentication purposes, a matter governed by
Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we first apply a
correction of error standard to the legal content of that
decision. See State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App.)
(applying correctness standard io issue of whether trial court
properly excluded photograph of car trunk), cert, denied. 857

950384-CA

2

T j g 4 8 (utah i y y i ^ _ i n maj<:ing this determination, "we i i •
(11 whether the trial court selected the correct rule of
evidence, (2) whether the trial court correctly interpreted that
rule, and (3) whether the trial court correctly applied the
rule. " IdL at ? n
Aiter reviewing the trial court's legal decision tor
correctness, we apply an abuse of discretion standard in
determining whether the trial court reasonably determined the
nonexpert witness properly authenticated the writing samples
pursuant to Rule 901. Id. at 714. Even if we find error in the
decision to admit evidence, such decision does not result in
reversible error unless the error is prejudicial. See State v.
Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 957 (Utah App. 1993), flff'd, 889 P.2d
419 (Ufah 199S) .
r

ISSUES ON APPEAL
We ntud decide whether the trial court erred xn admitting
the testimony of a nonexpert to authenticate handwriting samples,
when the witness had not personally observed the actual writinq
of such samples. Beyond this threshold question, defendant
contends the State failed to adequately prove the nonexpert's
familiarity with defendant's handwriting and the origin of that
familiarity, as required by Rule 901(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. The State counters that the origin of the nonexpert's
familiarity with defendant's handwriting was sufficiently proven
to support a finding of admissibility, and that, in any event,
any errcr in permitting the challenged testimony was harmless.
AUTHENTICATION UNDER RULE 901(b)(2)
The general rule governing the admissibility oi writings or
other documentary evidence is that the proponent, prior to
introducing such evidence, must first authenticate the evidence
by showing that it is what the proponent claims it to be. Utah
R. Evid. 901(a); State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). This process of
authentication must be distinguished from a finding of
authenticity. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Evidence § 9.2, at 1124 (1995). In their recent treatise,
Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain that the process of
authentication "deals
with the foundation required for
admitting evidence, and the adequacy of that foundation is
determined by the trial judge." Id. They also state that
although the jury is ultimately responsible for determining
whether the evidence is.in fact authentic once the evidence is
admitted, the court must, fulfill its screening function under

950384-CA
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Rule 104(b), 1 which requires the trial court "to assess whether
there is evidence sufficient to support a jury finding of
authenticity." Id. at 1124 (citations omitted). See also State
v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991) (distinguishing trial
court's role in making "any necessary preliminary factual
findings" in order to reach legal conclusions concerning
admissibility of evidence from jury's role in crediting or
discrediting admitted evidence); Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N.
Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 1-27 (1996)(stating resolution of fact
questions surrounding admissibility generally entrusted to
judge).
Utah Rule of Evidence 901(b) provides, by way of
illustration, several possible methods for authenticating a
writing. Specifically, Rule 901(b)(2) provides that a trial
court may allow a nonexpert witness to state an opinion as to the
authenticity of handwriting, provided that two requirements are
satisfied: first, that the witness is shown to be familiar with
the handwriting, and second, that it is established the witness's
familiarity was not gained for purposes of the litigation.2

1. Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as
follows:
Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
2.

Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows
(a) General provision. The requirement
of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of
illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following are examples of
authentication or identification conforming
with the requirements of this rule:
•

• • •

(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting.
Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of
handwriting/ Based'^upfen familiarity not
acquired for purposes of the litigation.
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As to the first requirement, it is inconsequential for the
trial court's determination whether the nonexpert has personally
observed the person put pen to paper or exactly how many times
the nonexpert has actually seen the person's handwriting; such
facts go only to the weight accorded the evidence by the jury.

See, e.g., United States v, Binzel, 907 F.2d 746, 749 (7th cir.
1990).

QL^ State v. Freshwater. 30 Utah 442, 447, 85 P. 447, 448

(1906) (stating it is "settled that no great degree of
familiarity with handwriting is required to render a witness
competent to give an opinion. If he has seen the person write a
single time, it has generally been held sufficient.") (citation
omitted).
Although there is no requirement that the nonexpert
personally observe the act of writing, Rule 901(b)(2) does
require that the nonexpert have an adequate familiarity with the
person's handwriting. The adequacy of familiarity may be present
"'if [the witness] has seen writings purporting to be those of
the person in question under circumstances indicating their

genuineness.'" United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196,
202 (8th Cir.) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick'S Handbook Qt
the Law of Evidence § 221, at 547 (2d ed. 1972)), cert, denied/
429 U.S. 1025 (1976).
The second requirement under Rule 901(b)(2) mandates that
any familiarity with the person's handwriting not have been
obtained for purposes of the present litigation. See People v.
CfiCSda, 851 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding rule was
violated when witness's familiarity with defendant's handwriting
was acquired after indictment was returned and for sole purpose
of testifying at defendant's trial). See also United States v.
Pitts. 569 F.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir.)(affirming trial court's
exclusion of nonexpert's opinion concerning signature on a
receipt when nonexpert made "one-shot" comparison with a genuine
signature for purposes of pending criminal investigation), cert.
denied. 436 U.S. 959 (1978). Under the second prong of
901(b)(2), a nonexpert may not offer an opinion as to the
genuineness of handwriting if it is established that the witness
gained familiarity for purposes of testifying in an action in
which the handwriting is at issue. In other words, the witness's
familiarity with the handwriting must predate the present
litigation.
In the instant case, the nonexpert called to authenticate
the writings at issue was Ms. Ragan, an attorney in the very
office that was prosecuting defendant. Ms. Ragan began her
testimony out of the jury's presence by stating that she knew
defendant from past contact with him. Ms. Ragan testified that
she had seen defendant's handwriting in certain documents he
filed with the trial cotyrt. ifc. past prosecutions. Ms. Ragan was
then shown two writings: a letter written to the prosecutor in
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the present action and the envelope in which the letter was sent.
Upon being shown these items, Ms. Ragan offered her opinion that
the handwriting contained in the letter and on the envelope was
that of defendant.3
As a whole, Ms. Ragan1s testimony indicates that she met the
first prong of Rule 901(b)(2), even though she had never
witnessed defendant in the act of writing. Her testimony
establishes that she did possess some degree of familiarity with
defendant's handwriting. Although Ms. Ragan demonstrated her
general familiarity with defendant's handwriting, her testimony
wholly fails to satisfy the second prong of Rule 901(b)(2).
To satisfy this second prong, the prosecution had to
demonstrate that Ms. Ragan1s ability to identify defendant's
handwriting predated the present litigation, i.e., that she did
not gain such familiarity specifically for purposes of preparing
to testify in the present action. Se$ Cepeda, 851 F.2d at 1567;
Pittsr 569 F.2d at 348. Her testimony is insufficient in this
respect because it fails to dispel the possibility--especially
distinct given the fact that she works as a deputy county
attorney who has prosecuted defendant in the past--that she
simply pulled defendant's files from past prosecutions and
compared his handwriting found therein to the handwriting on the
letter and envelope submitted in the present prosecution, all for
the sole purpose of testifying in this litigation at the request
of her fellow prosecutor.
Accordingly, given the deficiency in Ms. Ragan's testimony,
we must conclude that the court erred in admitting the letter and
envelope which were then used by the expert for purposes of
comparison with the forged prescription.
HARMLESS ERROR
We must still decide whether the trial court's error in
admitting Ms. Ragan's authentication testimony was harmless. The
doctrine of harmless error applies to "'errors which, although
properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
3. Ms. Ragan later testified to her opinion in the presence of
the jury, but was careful not to disclose that she had prosecuted
defendant on prior occasions'. 'Ms. Ragan testified that she was a
local attorney who knew defendant from unspecified prior dealings
and that she was familiar with defendant's handwriting. Again,
over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed Ms. Ragan to
state her opinion that the- handwriting in the envelope and letter
belonged to defendant.
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reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.1" State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 957-58 (Utah
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah
1989)), aff'd. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). For an error to require
reversal, "the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State
v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
In determining whether reversal is required, several factors
are considered, including lf,the importance of the witnesses]
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence co[rro]borating
or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of
course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.1" State
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987) (quoting Delaware v.
Van Arsdall. 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986)).
In the instant case, the prosecution attempted to connect
defendant to the forged prescription by showing the jury, through
expert testimony, that the handwriting in several past letters
and documents allegedly penned by defendant was the same as the
handwriting in the forged prescription. The first proffered
sample of defendant's handwriting was the specimen ordered by the
trial court prior to trial. The specimen contained letters of
the alphabet and various words, all written by defendant. After
proper authentication, the State's expert testified that the
specimen shared 18-20 points of common identification with the
prescription--not enough on which to base an opinion that the
prescription was definitely written by defendant.
The second sample of handwriting used for comparison by the
expert consisted of the items analyzed by Ms. Ragan. After Ms.
Ragan's purported authentication of these writings and their
admission into evidence, the State's expert testified that all 32
points of common identification were present. Therefore, the
expert concluded that the handwriting in the documents
authenticated by Ms. Ragan and the handwriting in the forged
prescription definitely belonged to the same person, namely
defendant.
Thus, Ms. Ragan was a critical witness for the State. Her
testimony led to the admission into evidence of the very
handwriting samples which allowed the State's expert to make a
conclusive comparison with the forged prescription. The jury
also heard her state she was"familiar with defendant's writing
and that the letter and envelope considered by the expert
appeared to have been written by defendant. Finally, her
testimony enabled the jury to conduct its own comparison of the
handwriting in the forged prescription and in the specimens she
authenticated. See Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(3) (allowing trier of
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fact to make its own comparison with authenticated specimens of
handwriting). Had Ms. Ragan been precluded from authenticating
the writings at issue, the expert would have been left with only
the problematic court-ordered sample to compare with the
prescription. Although the court-ordered sample contained 18-20
points of common identification with the prescription, it was not
nearly as incriminating as the comparison with the samples
authenticated by Ms. Ragan, which contained all 32 possible
points of common identification. Thus, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have returned a verdict in favor
of defendant in the absence of Ms. Ragan's testimony and the
resulting evidence.4 Therefore, we cannot conclude that the
court's error in admitting Ms. Ragan's testimony was sufficiently
inconsequential as to constitute harmless error.
This conclusion is especially compelling in view of the
overall strength of the State's case. The State presented the
testimony of several other witnesses. Although these witnesses
testified that they saw a male resembling defendant in the
pharmacy on the day in question, and that defendant possibly had
the opportunity to obtain blank prescription pads,5 none of these
witnesses could make a positive identification of defendant as
the person passing the forged prescription.
CONCLUSION
Before allowing Ms. Ragan to provide authentication
testimony on the samples of defendant's handwriting, the trial
court should have required testimony as to the origin of Ms.
4. It should be noted that appellate courts are especially
reluctant to find errors harmless when they concern opinions
given by experts, see, e.g.. State v. Iora. 801 P.2d 938, 941-42
(Utah App. 1990), given the perception that jurors tend to give
great weight to such testimony. Although Ms. Ragan was not
herself an expert, her authentication testimony paved the way for
the expert's ultimate opinion that defendant forged the
prescription, the single most incriminating part of the State's
case.
5. The State presented the testimony of Dr. Bateman. Dr.
Bateman testified that on September 26, 1994, he had treated
defendant for a sprained knee and prescribed defendant "Lodine,"
an anti-inflammatory drug.. Dr: Bateman testified that at the
time of this treatment, defendant had been left alone in the
examination room for a few minutes, which is customary in the
doctor's office, and that the room had contained blank
prescription pads, perhaps.including some in the name of his
associate, Dr. Olsen.
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Ragan's familiarity with defendant's handwriting, and, in
particular, whether it was acquired for purposes of this
litigation. Because Ms. Ragan's testimony is completely lacking
in this regard, the trial court erred in admitting Ms. Ragan's
authentication testimony and related evidence. This error was
not harmless. Therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction and
remand for a new trial.

€X

Gregory K^Orme
Presidirfg Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judc
Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
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ADDENDUM B

Km SANPETE VALLEY HOSPITAL and MEDICAL CLINICS
Robert D. Armetong, M.D.
DEANo AA2726365

Jan C. Jonson, PA-C
PhygoaiLAfiEtont - Certified

Kim A Bateman, M.D.

Bruce Burnham, MJD.
DEANo AB7577844

Darrd Oben, M.D?
B024679

Gene E. Speakman, M.D.
DEA No AS1639826

2tt>r

Address.

Manti Family Clinic
159 North Main
Mantt UT S4642
N
635-9231
£phraiai Medical Clinic
99 South Main
Ephraim UT 64627
263*4076

AB6656409

3nELS f*»fa &^4=£^

D

Moroni Medical Clinic '*T}
394 East 100 South
Moroni, UT 64646
436-8271
Mt. Pleasant Family
Health Center
1100 South Medical Drive
Mt Pleasant UT 64647
462-3471

DEANo

*?5 / V«-6«fkA>/
8*0

Y^L^r^ys>x*~
3 Dispense as written

Refill.
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